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5
Implicit Bias, Character,
and Control
Jules Holroyd and Daniel Kelly
Implicit biases are automatic associations, often operational without the
reﬂective awareness of the agent, which inﬂuence action.1 This inﬂuence
can be malign—affecting negatively individuals’ evaluations and judge-
ments of, and interactions with, individuals in stereotyped or stigmatized
groups (social identities such as race, gender, religious identity, age, and
mental illness have all been studied). The effects may be relatively minor:
implicit biases can increase the number of times one blinks one’s eyes
when interacting with a member of another race, which in turn can
degrade the quality of those interracial interactions. Or the effects may be
of grave consequence, such as increasing the likelihood of shooting a
black man reaching for an ambiguous object (could be a gun, could be
a wallet or mobile phone). Both kinds of effects systemically contribute
to and re-entrench patterns of discrimination and marginalization.2
In the studies that have proliferated on implicit bias, one outcome
is indisputable—almost all of us harbour, and are inﬂuenced by, some
kinds of implicit bias, to some degree.3
1 We would like to thank the following people for useful feedback on earlier presenta-
tions and drafts of this material: Michael Brownstein, Natalia Washington, Alex Madva, the
attendees of the Implicit Bias and Philosophy workshops held at the University of Shefﬁeld,
audiences at the University of Edinburgh, and the editors of this volume, Jonathan Webber
and Alberto Masala, and anonymous reviewers for this volume.
2 Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Devine 2003; Payne 2005.
3 For an excellent overview of the range of biases and their pervasive effects, see Jost et al.
2009.
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Our focus here is on whether, when inﬂuenced by implicit biases,
those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of
that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be
morally evaluated.4 We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state,
process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant
sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her
character. A number of theorists have argued that individuals do not
have control, in the relevant sense, over the operation of implicit bias.
We will argue that this claim is mistaken. We articulate and develop a
notion of control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias, and
argue that this kind of control can ground character-based evaluation of
such behavioural dispositions.
First we introduce two perspectives on implicit bias and character
(section 5.1). In section 5.2 we evaluate the arguments for the conclusion
that individuals lack the relevant sense of control with respect to implicit
bias. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 we elaborate on one sense of control—
Clark’s ‘ecological control’—which we argue is a sense of control that
enables us to consider implicit biases as ‘part of who the agent is’, and
hence something that is a legitimate candidate for normative evaluation.
We go on (in section 5.5) to show that this requires some emendation to
recent ways of thinking about the development of moral character and
self-regulation.
5.1 Character, Evaluation, and Implicit Bias
Some philosophers who have written on implicit bias have homed in on
the idea that such implicit associations are ‘rogue’ processes, which are
not properly seen as part of the agent’s character—not indicative of ‘who
she is’. For example, Jennifer Saul has suggested that we should reject the
thought that ‘acknowledging that one is biased means declaring oneself
to be one of those bad racist or sexist people’ (ms, 21). Whilst this is
recommended for pragmatic reasons (namely, getting people to acknow-
ledge that they may harbour implicit biases), we take it that the
underlying assumption here is that having negative race or gender biases
4 For other questions that have been raised in relation to implicit bias, see Gendler 2011,
Holroyd 2012, Kelly and Roedder 2008, Saul ms. Many other fruitful papers can be found
here: <http://www.biasproject.org/recommended-reading>.
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does not reﬂect badly on one’s character. Merely being inﬂuenced by
implicit bias does not mean that one has the character of a racist or sexist
person; it takes something other than the operation of implicit racial
biases to be properly ascribed the character trait racist. Likewise, Joshua
Glasgow has emphasized that many of us are alienated from such
attitudes, and tend to regard implicit bias and the behaviours inﬂuenced
by them as ‘actions and attitudes that do not represent us in any real
sense at all’ (ms, 7). Glasgow’s remarks here resonate with the idea that
implicit biases do not constitute ‘who we are’, or form part of our
characters. Finally, Neil Levy (2012) has indicated that the associative
structure of implicit biases, and the fact that they are not subject to ‘rule-
based-processing’ in the way that our explicit attitudes are, means that
such states cannot play a role in unifying us as agents and can actually
undermine our ability to express ‘who we are’ in our actions over time.
This treatment contrasts with that of Lorraine Besser-Jones, who implies
that implicit biases can legitimately be taken into consideration when
evaluating a person’s character. Insofar as behavioural dispositions are a
part of character, and implicit biases produce certain behavioural disposi-
tions, then those implicit biases qualify as part of an individual’s moral
character, for which they can be evaluated (and perhaps blamed). This
emerges in her treatment of the following example (we quote at length):
Take the case of Jane and Mark. Jane believes that everyone deserves equal
treatment, and condemns racism. Yet, whenever she sees a black man walking
down the street, she averts her eyes and, if possible, crosses the street. She feels
guilty when she does so, but nonetheless cannot help herself from acting in these
ways. Mark, on the other hand, holds racist beliefs about the inferiority of African
Americans. He, too, averts his eyes and crosses the street when encountering a
black man. He, too, feels guilty when he does so, after all, it is not as if he holds
anything ‘personal’ against the man, but is simply acting on the basis of what he
thinks is right.
Jane and Mark share very similar dispositions—both behavioral dispositions,
and dispositions to feel certain ways in response to their behavioral
dispositions—nonetheless, all would agree that they have different moral char-
acters: Jane is what psychologists label an ‘aversive racist’—one who is ‘con-
sciously non-prejudiced yet unconsciously prejudiced’; her character is
signiﬁcantly different than Mark’s, whose character is prejudiced on all levels.
(2008, 317, see also discussion in her 2014, 82)
Besser-Jones uses this example to make the point that an individual’s
beliefs, and not simply her behavioural dispositions, are the basis of
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character: the right account incorporates both, she argues. What is
striking from our point of view is that Besser-Jones nonetheless sees
the behavioural dispositions involved in Jane’s ‘aversive racism’—a form
of racism underpinned by negative implicit biases—as a legitimate (par-
tial) basis for evaluating her moral character. A full evaluation of her
moral character should take into account those dispositions, and the
behaviour that manifests them, contra the starting assumptions of Saul,
Glasgow, and Levy.
Which view should we endorse? Both perspectives have some appeal:
insofar as implicit biases are not under an individual’s control and are
attitudes from which she is alienated, it does seem somewhat unfair to
treat them as evaluable in the same way as her considered and endorsed
beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, one might think that implicit biases
reﬂect mere epistemic mistakes rather than character ﬂaws, and that
being inﬂuenced by them can be evaluated only by tracing back to these
original errors, which are not ﬂaws of character.
But there is intuitive appeal in Besser-Jones’s position also. Her
emphasis is on the extent to which individuals’ moral commitments
and beliefs interact with and shape their behavioural dispositions (and
their practical attitudes towards success or failure in doing so) (2008,
322). Moreover, we think it defensible to consider the operation of implicit
bias in terms of character, since (as we will see) the operation of implicit
biases interact with agents’ values in various ways. And, even if an epi-
stemic error is at issue, this does not render questions of character
irrelevant: the mistakes individuals make are often reﬂective of who they
are (their values, with respect to what they are scrupulous, say).
The operation of implicit bias can be thought of in terms of character,
then; but should it be? Besser-Jones’s comments direct us to the import-
ant question of the extent to which individuals can exercise control over
the expression in behaviour and judgement of their own implicit biases.
Are these processes and the behavioural dispositions they produce the
kind of things that individuals can regulate or control so as to bring their
actions into line with their considered evaluative commitments? If not,
then the manifestation of implicit bias starts to look more like the spasm
of a hand, or perhaps the intrusion of compulsive or phobic thoughts—
uncontrollable, and not attributable to the agent in a way that enables us
to evaluate her, or her evaluative commitments, on the basis of such
behaviours. Crucial in answering this question, then, is assessing whether
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individuals have control over the expression of implicit biases. We start
to address this question in the following section.
5.2 Control Conditions and Implicit Bias
It has been commonplace to contrast implicit associations with con-
trolled processing.5 The idea that implicit biases are not under the agent’s
control has contributed to and underpinned the claim that individuals
are not responsible for implicit biases, and that they don’t ‘stand for’ who
the agent is. This is bound up with the nature of such biases as ‘implicit’:
‘without the consciousness of having an implicit race bias, it seems
difﬁcult or impossible to exert control to correct it’ (Cameron et al.
2010, 275). But this is too simple. Notions of control proliferate in the
philosophical literature,6 and to ascertain whether individuals are able to
exercise control over their implicit biases in a way that can legitimize
evaluation of them as part of one’s character, we need to take care to be
clear about what sense(s) of control might be at issue. In this section, we
examine some candidate notions of control, as they are found in the
current literature.
5.2.1 Direct control
Saul has suggested that individuals’ lack of direct control over implicit
biases should exempt individuals from moral responsibility for them:
individuals ‘do not [when made aware of biases] instantly become able to
control their biases, and so they should not be blamed for them’ (2013, 55).
This sounds reasonable, but many traits and dispositions that are typic-
ally thought of as part of our characters are not under any kind of direct
or immediate control, either. Indeed, the cultivation of stable disposi-
tions to act that are underpinned by evaluative commitments has
5 Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, and Johnson 1997.
6 Some of the more interesting notions taken from the philosophical literature include:
ultimate control (Kane 1989), regulative and guidance control (Fischer and Ravizza 1999),
rational control (Smith M. 2001, Smith A. 2008), intervention control (Snow 2006),
valuative control (Hieronymi 2006), indirect control (Arpaly 2003), long-range control
(Feldman 2008), narrative control (Velleman 2005; he never uses the terminology, but we
feel this captures the general idea), ecological or soft control (Clark 2007), ﬂuent control
(Railton 2009), habitual control (Romdenh-Romluc 2011), skilled control (Annas 2011),
and dialogic control (Doris 2015).
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traditionally been considered to require time and practice.7 We submit
that less direct types of control are often actually paradigmatic of the
kind of control we have over aspects of our character—witness, for
instance, the Aristotelian notion of habituation of virtuous traits. As
such, being subject to such indirect types of control permits a mental
state or disposition to count as a component of a person’s character, and
so to be properly the object of character-based moral evaluations.
However, even if individuals have indirect control over implicit biases
there remains further unpacking of the kind of indirect control at issue.
Moreover, doubts may remain about the signiﬁcance of other important
forms of control that we don’t have over the operation of implicit biases,
such that it may indeed be inappropriate to consider the agent respon-
sible for their inﬂuence. We now consider three further kinds of control
that, arguably, individuals lack with respect to implicit biases.
5.2.2 Uniﬁed agency and reﬂective control
Levy argues that ‘agents should be excused responsibility for actions
caused by implicit attitudes’ (2011, 17). One central idea that supports
this claim, from Levy, is that implicit attitudes have an associative
structure, and as such cannot play a role in unifying the agent. On
Levy’s account, being an agent—being an individual with evaluative
commitments that structure one’s plans and projects—requires being
able to manifest a kind of ‘diachronic unity’. Diachronic unity requires
being able to plan and pursue projects, which in turn requires that one’s
attitudes must be norm-governed such that they can satisfy certain
desiderata like avoiding inconsistency and meeting rationality require-
ments of means-ends reasoning. Explicit attitudes and beliefs are gov-
erned by these sorts of norms, and are a kind of ‘rule-based processing’
(Levy 2011, 13), which enables individuals to bring their evaluative
commitments into a coherent structure, and plan according to them.
In this way, we can see ‘where the agent stands’ over time. But Levy
argues that the associative, non-inferential structure of implicit biases
(and other implicit associations and processes) simply means that they
are not so governed, and so not the kind of state that can underpin this
7 For detailed evaluation of this control condition for moral responsibility in relation to
implicit bias, see Holroyd 2012.
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sort of uniﬁcation.8 Since they are not under the agent’s control in a way
that enables the uniﬁcation of agency and the expression, over time, of
who the agent is, they are not the proper objects of evaluative assess-
ments, nor relevant to the evaluation of the agent’s character.
We disagree for two reasons. First, we see no reason to suppose that
implicit, associative processes in general, as a kind of mental structure,
cannot contribute to the uniﬁcation of an agent. Consider for example
the ﬁndings from Moskowitz and Li (2011): individuals who were
actively committed to ‘egalitarian’ goals (goals of treating individuals
fairly) were better able to regulate the expression of negative implicit
biases. This ‘active commitment’ involved being strongly committed, in
reports on explicit beliefs, to such egalitarian values, and having the
speciﬁc goal of treating people fairly activated. As goal activation can
be automatic, this need not involve conscious strivings or effort. Because
the regulation was not due to conscious effort (subjects were placed
under cognitive loads to prevent this), the results indicate that automatic
implicit processes, outside of the awareness of reﬂective agency, are
serving to bring behaviour into conformity with explicit values. If this
is right, then there are cases in which non-inferential, associative, pro-
cesses seem to be able to play a role in unifying agency. (See also Devine
et al. (2002), who also hypothesize that in individuals strongly commit-
ted to fair treatment, preconscious and automatic regulatory systems
inhibit the expression of implicit bias.)
Second, even if we accept Levy’s claim that such states disrupt or fail to
contribute to uniﬁed agency, this by itself does not entail that such states
are not candidates for moral evaluation in an agent who meets some
threshold of unity by other means. For example, it is implausible that
behavioural dispositions, in isolation or on their own, would achieve
Levy’s required kind of unity. Rather, beliefs and commitments that
structure these behavioural dispositions are also needed to achieve that
unity. But this does not mean that, once an agent meets the threshold of
unity, and is able to pursue projects coherently over time, their behav-
ioural dispositions remain outside the scope of moral evaluation. Analo-
gously, we can happily accept the claim that implicit biases, operating in
isolation and on their own, do not themselves have or provide the
8 It is not uncontroversial that implicit processing is associative (see Mandelbaum 2015),
but we grant this assumption for the purposes of argument.
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structure required for uniﬁed agency. This, however, does not entail that
the operation of those implicit biases contribute nothing to who the
(otherwise uniﬁed) agent is, or that they cannot be the target of evalu-
ation. Consider an individual’s associations concerning gender and lead-
ership: many have been found to have stronger associations between
men—rather than women—and leadership qualities (see Valian 2005).
This association alone could of course not provide the unity Levy
requires for agency. (It is hard to see how any association by itself,
implicit or otherwise, could do that.) But once the agent meets the
threshold of unity that makes her qualiﬁed for normative evaluation in
general, this component of her cognitive make-up also becomes a viable
target of assessment, and we can consider whether it reﬂects well or badly
on her.
5.2.3 Alienation and evaluative control
One might still ﬁnd something troubling in the idea that certain actions
are inﬂuenced by processes (e.g. negative implicit biases) which conﬂict
with explicit attitudes (commitment to fair treatment), and which one is
unable to bring into line with one’s explicit attitudes. That is, one might
worry that implicit biases are not subject to the sort of ‘evaluative control’
that we have over other parts of our cognitive structures.10 One might
insist that if an agent’s action or judgement ‘is not responsive . . . to the
beliefs, values, and so on of the agent, then the person has lost control
over it’ (Levy 2011, 5) and therefore that action or judgement cannot be
indicative of where she stands as an agent—it is not part of her character.
The cases of implicit bias that have garnered the most attention are
those in which the individuals’ explicit attitudes come apart from her
implicit associations. For example, a person has explicit attitudes endors-
ing anti-discrimination, whilst being inﬂuenced by implicit associations
between black men and negative stereotypical associations. In such cases,
actions driven by the person’s implicit biases appear to be candidates for
actions which are out of control, in exactly this sense: they are unrespon-
sive to the agent’s explicit evaluative attitudes (at least her considered
evaluative attitudes), and in that respect she is alienated from her implicit
attitude.
10 See also Smith 2008.
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The notion of alienation has been used to capture this psychological state
of affairs, where a person is alienated from certain states or processes that
are present in her psychologicalmake-up. The notion has also loomed large
in ‘real-self ’ views of moral responsibility, where some have argued that
‘alienation’ can (in at least some cases) exculpate because those alienated
states or dispositions are not part of the ‘real self ’. However, we see no good
reason to suppose that alienation entails that the states from which the
agent is alienated should not be part of our evaluation of that agent. As
Besser-Jones claimed in relation to Mark and Jane, it is not only that Jane
has implicit biases, but also that she is alienated from them that should be
reﬂected in our evaluation of her character (as less bad in this respect than
Mark—but, we add, less good than some third character who neither has
nor manifests implicit race bias). Here we also ﬁnd ourselves sympathetic
to aspects of Josh Glasgow’s treatment of alienation from implicit bias.
Focusing on a case of dissociated implicit and explicit attitudes, Glasgow
identiﬁes such implicit attitudes as ones from which the agent is alienated.
Nonetheless, asking us to reﬂect on our own judgements about our rela-
tionship to those attitudes from which we are alienated, Glasgow strongly
asserts that, whilst conﬁdent in his alienation from the implicit biases he
harbours, and ‘wholeheartedly disavow[ing] such nonsense’, he would not
doubt their presence, nor that he is culpable for their presence: ‘alienation is
not sufﬁcient for exculpation’ (ms, 8). In short, while being alienated from
one’s implicit biases is relevant to the evaluation of one’s character, it does
not completely absolve one from having or being inﬂuenced by those
implicit biases.
Whilst primarily concerned with moral responsibility, Glasgow here
holds two distinctive claims: a) that implicit biases are not part of the
agent’s moral character (due to alienation, or lack of evaluative control),
and b) that nonetheless, the presence of those biases can inﬂuence the
moral evaluation of her and her actions.11 We agree with Glasgow that
moral evaluation is appropriate. However, we reject the idea that lack of
evaluative control (the sort of ‘alienation’ identiﬁed here) entails that
implicit biases are not part of ‘who the agent is’. In the following section
(5.3), we articulate a kind of control that sufﬁces for considering implicit
biases are part of moral character.
11 See also Stump 1996.
 JULES HOLROYD AND DANIEL KELLY
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 21/9/2015, SPi
Comp. by: hramkumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002605673 Date:21/9/15
Time:09:50:29 Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002605673.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 115
5.2.4 Intervention control
So far, we have examined claims about the lack of direct control over
implicit biases, about their associative structure that does not underwrite
uniﬁed agency, and about the fact that agents are often ‘alienated’ from
the implicit biases they may be inﬂuenced by. We have argued that none
of these considerations provides sufﬁcient reason to suppose that impli-
cit biases are not part of an agent’s character, and so should be left out of
evaluations of ‘who she is’ and ‘what she stands for’.
However, a further concern may remain: if implicit biases inﬂuence
behaviour and judgement without the agent being able to prevent
them, then we should not consider the inﬂuence of implicit biases
in behaviour—such behavioural dispositions—as part of the agent’s
character. These behavioural dispositions should be considered more
like an agent’s disposition for her hand to spasm under certain
circumstances—something outside of her control, and not therefore
attributable to her. We might identify the worry here in terms of a lack
of ‘intervention’ or ‘inhibition’ control—the agent’s ability to inhibit
certain actions that are not expressive of her core values and moral
commitments (see Levy 2011, 16). Nancy Snow articulates the notion
of inhibition or intervention control in her discussion of virtuous
agency and its relation to the automatic processing involved in the
pursuit of virtuous goals. Snow notes that whilst automatic processes
can be initiated and run without the guidance of reﬂective deliberation,
they are nonetheless attributable to the agent insofar as she has inter-
vention control over them. An agent exercises intervention control
when she intervenes in an instance of behaviour that is unfolding
smoothing and relatively unthinkingly on its own (such as cycling
while on ‘autopilot mode’)—either inhibiting that behaviour or redir-
ecting it (2006, 549).
A question that this raises is whether individuals have the ability to
intervene in, and bring under reﬂective control, the manifestation of
their own implicit biases. Surely if one cannot in any way prevent the
expression of implicit biases, one is not properly morally evaluable for
those expressions?
Some empirical studies indicate that there is indeed trouble lurking
here; attempts to consciously suppress implicit biases are notoriously
problematic, and an individual’s lack of awareness of the extent to which
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she is inﬂuenced by implicit biases seems to threaten her ability to inhibit
their inﬂuence.12
Accordingly, we are willing to concede that understood thus, individ-
uals will often lack intervention control over implicit biases. However, we
believe—and argue in the next two sections—that this articulation of
‘intervention control’ is too narrow, focusing only on the ability to
inhibit implicit processes by bringing them directly and immediately
under reﬂective control. To make our case, we articulate a model that
draws together more extensive resources for intervening in behaviour
and bringing one’s actions and judgements into line with one’s evaluative
commitments. We argue that this model of control can underpin the idea
that implicit biases should legitimately be included in the evaluation of
an agent’s character, before articulating (in section 5.5) how this prompts
us to revise the notion of self-regulation and character development.
5.3 Clark on Ecological Control
In this section we develop an account of control according to which
implicit biases are (or can be brought) under an agent’s control. We also
argue that in light of this account of control, implicit biases can be
thought of as part of a person’s character, and are thus relevant to the
moral evaluation of that character. We draw on and develop Andy
Clark’s notion of ‘ecological control’, using Clark’s articulation of this
idea as our point of departure to simplify our own exposition, and
because he has done so much to unpack and defend it. We situate the
model within Clark’s larger picture before going on to develop and apply
it in the context of empirical research on implicit biases.
5.3.1 Motivating the idea
What is it to exercise ecological control in cognition and action? Clark
elucidates it as follows:
12 See Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; and Saul ms for pursuit of the question of whether
this unawareness should lead us to quite radical sceptical conclusions. On the other hand,
empirical ﬁndings from Monteith and Voils (1998) indicate that at least sometimes
individuals are aware that their actions are not in conformity with their ideals, and able
to attribute this to implicit biases.
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Ecological control is the kind of top-level control that does not micro-manage
every detail, but rather encourages substantial devolvement of power and respon-
sibility . . .And it allows (I claim) much of our prowess at thought and reason to
depend upon the robust and reliable operation, often (but not always) in dense
brain-involving loops, of a variety of non-biological problem-solving resources
spread throughout our social and technological surround. (Clark 2007, 101)
One well-known element of Clark’s model is alluded to here, namely his
commitment to the idea that the boundaries of minds, and even selves,
are ﬂuid, and need not coincide with the biological boundaries of the
organisms they animate (see Clark and Chalmers 1998; cf. Sterelny 2003,
2010). Clark holds that this is especially true of human beings, who
exploit and incorporate features of the physical structure of their own
bodies and surrounding environment into their strategies of acting and
pursuing goals, thus exemplifying the type of ecological control in which
he is interested. Various processes employed by ‘ecological controllers’
incorporate features of their bodies and of the external world, integrating
them into ‘whole new uniﬁed systems of distributed problem-solving’
(Clark 2007, 103).
Ecological control is devolved, distributed, diffuse, decentralized, often
spread out over time, and typically not accompanied by the kind of rich
consciousness-awareness characteristic of higher-level and reﬂective
cognition. This type of control is obviously involved in some lower-
level physiological systems. However, Clark claims it is not restricted to
‘the “autonomic” functions (breathing, heart-beat, etc.)’ but instead
holds that ‘all kinds of human activities turn out to be partly supported
by quasi-independent non-conscious sub-systems’ (Clark 2007, 110).
Indeed, ecological control often involves the effective coordination and
calibration of such subsystems: corralling, nudging, tweaking their
coordinated operation in the service of a particular goal, rather than
micromanaging every detail of each individual component. Consider the
simple act of reaching out our hand to pick up a coffee mug. While this
may seem simplicity itself, and a behavior under near complete conscious
control, Clark argues that even in this case the appearance is misleading,
and that ‘ﬁne-tuned reaching and grasping involves the delicate use of
visually-received information by functionally and neuro-anatomically
distinct sub-systems operating, for the most part, outside the window of
conscious awareness’ (Clark 2007, 109). Even in this mundane case, much
of the control of behaviour is distributed throughout the ‘non-conscious
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circuitry that guides themost delicate shape-and-position sensitive aspects
of reach and grasp’ (Clark 2007, 109–10).
So pathways of ecological control—‘loops’ of inﬂuence, as Clark and
others sometimes call them—are mediated by sub-personal structures
and subsystems of which the organism is not directly aware or in
immediate, direct, control at the personal level. Ecological controllers
often exploit the features of those sub-personal structures and subsys-
tems to their advantage, to simplify problem-solving and ﬁne-tune
performance in the service of achieving their personal goals and com-
plying with their personal values. (Clark uses the personal/sub-personal
distinction, but the terminology originates with Dennett 1969, see also
Elton 2000.)
As mentioned above, though, Clark holds that these kinds of sub-
personal structures and subsystems need not be conﬁned to the organ-
ism’s skin. Organisms who employ ecological control to manage their
behaviour (of whom humans are the example par excellence) often do so
by reshaping, even incorporating, elements of their extra-bodily envir-
onment into the process of ﬁne-tuning their performance. Loops of
ecological control can extend into the environment and back again.
Humans do not just exploit the structure they ﬁnd outside their own
bodies and heads, but rather take an active hand in shaping and organ-
izing that environment in such a way that it, too, helps them to ﬁne-tune
actions, solve problems, realize their intentions, and express their values.
In other words, one central feature of human agency involves supple-
menting the internal sub-personal mechanisms that guide behaviour by
engineering their world, calibrating ‘external’ sub-personal structures so
that they help simplify cognition and bring out the kinds of behaviours
and outcomes to which they aspire. A particularly compelling example of
this is the effort people put into organizing their ofﬁces, to do things like
maximize productivity, manage their own moods (or at least ward off
despair!) and generally make things epistemically easier on themselves.
As Clark points out, in organizing an ofﬁce, an individual attunes her
surroundings to her own particular epistemic needs. In taking such
measures, individuals seek to structure and stabilize their environments
in ways that ‘simplify or enhance the problem-solving that needs to be
done’ (Clark 2007, 115).
A crucial aspect of the notion, as developed by Clark, is that one goal
that people might attempt to achieve using ecological control is to further
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calibrate the operation of speciﬁc sub-personal mechanisms. We might
shape our external environments as a means to more effectively manipu-
lating sub-personal operations. Here we see the recursive use of control
to enhance and heighten control itself. An agent can do this by ﬁne-
tuning the role of subsystems which in turn help produce dispositions
and behaviours that can better fulﬁl her more distal goals, thus allowing
her to better behave in ways that more precisely reﬂect her intentions,
and more crisply conform to her considered ideals and values. Ultim-
ately, a person can calibrate subsystems that guide behaviour until
eventually they operate, on their own, in precisely the way she wants
them to operate, even when she is not consciously and explicitly attend-
ing to them.
5.3.2 Developing Clark’s model
With the idea of ecological control outlined, an ambiguity in our pres-
entation of it so far can now be teased out. Sometimes, what we call the
exercise of ecological control involves executing actions or parts of
actions without the guidance of reﬂective, deliberative control.
A professional tennis player exercises ecological control, for example,
when instinctively responding—without deliberate, reﬂective, thought—
to a baseline shot in tennis. However, individuals can take ecological
control of something when they reﬂectively decide to manipulate their
mental states or environment, so as to shape their cognitive processes,
thus enabling the exercise of ecological control in the future. Given this
distinction, what we are calling ‘taking’ ecological control does require
that the agent is at least sometimes able to reﬂectively control their
behaviour. So we acknowledge that the capacity for and occasional
exercise of this more deliberate and reﬂective kind of control is necessary
for evaluable action, although its exercise on any one occasion is not.
We mentioned that one way of taking ecological control is by cali-
brating subsystems, and one way to do that is to practise. Rehearsal is a
common way to deliberately hone a skill, calibrating the sub-personal
structures that implement it, making the whole process routine enough
that eventually intentions can be expressed smoothly, automatically, and
without deliberation, and the performance of the ﬁne-tuned, goal-
directed behaviour is natural, easy, and unthinking. This kind of agency
can involve and is often accompanied by reﬂective control—the ability
to reﬂectively decide upon a high-level course of action and carry it
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out—but with a view to ultimately obviating the need for reﬂective
agency (or much of it) over lower-level, component parts of the behav-
iour being practised. In other words, one of the uses of ecological control
is that it can be used to attain what Railton (2009) calls ﬂuid agency.
Once achieved, high-level intentions consciously formed at the personal
level can be ﬂuidly enacted via pathways of ecological control mediated
by those previously calibrated sub-personal mechanisms, without each
individual step being directly controlled or consciously attended to along
the way (and perhaps without need for reference to intention; see
Romdenh-Romluc 2011). As Clark notes, examples of this use of eco-
logical control can be drawn from sport: ‘This is no surprise, I am sure, to
any sports player: it doesn’t even seem, when playing a fast game of
squash, as if your conscious perception of the ball is, moment-by-
moment, guiding your hand and racket’ (Clark 2007, 17). But as we
will see (in section 5.4.3), the particular line of thought can be extended
from sports to other domains, and from the sub-personal subsystems
that underlie behaviour to those that underlie evaluation and judgement.
Another way of taking ecological control is to co-opt aspects of what is
intuitively thought of as our external environment, shaping it so that it
can better guide our cognitive processes in a way congenial to our goals
and values. In short, beyond the distinction between exercising and
taking ecological control, there are several ways in which we can exert
ecological control over mental entities. And, as we set out in the next
section, there are ways in which we can take and exercise ecological
control over implicit biases.
5.4 Ecological Control and Implicit Bias
Implicit biases are troublesome not just because they can contribute to
morally problematic outcomes, but also because of their psychological
proﬁle. They pose a problem for moral evaluation because they are not
introspectively accessible, and so can coexist unknown and alongside
explicit attitudes to the contrary; because they can operate outside of
conscious awareness; are associative, not under our direct evaluative
control, and once activated their expression in judgement and behaviour
is difﬁcult to directly manage or completely suppress. But, as we argued
in section 5.2, none of these features sufﬁces to exempt it from moral
evaluation. Here, we address two questions: ﬁrst, do we have ecological
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control over implicit biases (do we exercise ecological control, and can
we take ecological control)? Second, is ecological control sufﬁcient (or
part of a set of jointly sufﬁcient conditions) for moral evaluation?
Whilst not subject to the kinds of control we considered in section 5.2,
empirical work has shown that implicit biases are ‘malleable’ in a number
of ways. This empirical research has investigated the most effective ways
of impeding the inﬂuence of implicit biases, and revealed that some
strategies work while others don’t (and still others seem to make matters
worse). It has also shown that intuition and common sense tend to be a
poor guide to which strategies are likely to be successful. But most
importantly it has shown that there is a very real sense in which a person
can exert control over her implicit biases. We hold that Clark’s notion of
ecological control provides a useful way to think about the nature of that
control. We identify three different kinds of ecological control that might
be exercised in relation to implicit biases. Drawing on the distinction
introduced above, we present the ﬁrst two as concerning instances in
which individualsmight reﬂectively take ecological control, to better enable
their actions to conform to their values. The third example of exercising
ecological control indicates that individuals’ actions can draw on implicit
processes so as to be inﬂuenced by and calibrated with our values, even
when intentional strategies have not been implemented to ensure this.
5.4.1 Environmental props consciously employed
for guiding cognitive processes
Clark emphasizes that ecological control can involve the ‘ofﬂoading’ of
cognitive structures onto the world beyond the boundaries of the skin
(recall the example of structuring one’s ofﬁce to facilitate one’s profes-
sional activities). One might use similar means to help mitigate one’s
implicit biases as well. For instance, early studies (Dasgupta and
Greenwald 2001) showed that the inﬂuence of some implicit racial biases
could be weakened simply by exposing participants to pictures of
admired black celebrities and other counter-stereotypical images. So, a
person might rein in the expression of her own implicit racial biases by
putting up pictures of admired black celebrities around her ofﬁce, thus
taking indirect, ecological control over those biases so that her judge-
ments and actions more ﬂuidly express her character and values.
A person might engineer her ‘external’ epistemic environment in other
ways to ensure that her intentions and values are more ﬂuidly expressed
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in her actions and judgements, and not distorted by the operation of
implicit biases. For instance, if one is (justiﬁably) worried about implicit
biases corrupting the assessment of candidates in a job search, one can
take measures to remove information from application dossiers that may
trigger those implicit biases in the ﬁrst place.
5.4.2 Cognitive props consciously employed for guiding
cognitive processes
Another promising strategy for mitigating the inﬂuence of implicit biases
has been investigated under the name of ‘implementation intentions’
(Webb, Sheeran, and Pepper 2012). For example, an individual seeking
to exert control over her implicit biases might deliberately repeat to
herself, ‘If I see a Black face, I will think “safe”,’ practising this line of
thought enough that it becomes routine and automatic, thus defeating
her implicit racial bias. One might draw an analogy to Clark’s discussion
of a sports player who practises, calibrating the operation of sub-personal
subsystems to bring them in line with intentions, and thus developing a
certain kind of ﬂuid and unthinking control. In the case of implicit biases
a person does not practise, say, a backhand tennis stroke or the subtle
biomechanics required to throw a curveball, but rather rehearses a
psychological process aimed at forming a particular kind of counter-
bias association. Once successfully formed, that new association will be
able to bring the way she makes snap judgements into line with her more
thought out intentions, thus better reﬂecting her character and values.
5.4.3 Automatic processes as props unconsciously employed
for guiding cognitive processes
Following Clark, we have argued that some features of our environment
can shape our cognitive processes, and can be manipulated so as to
inﬂuence the subsystems that will produce judgements and actions. We
also hold that automatic features of our mental processes can be manipu-
lated in similar ways, and to similar ends. Recall the ﬁnding, mentioned
above (Moskowitz and Li 2011), that individuals who were actively
committed to egalitarian goals (without consciously reﬂecting on such
goals themselves) manifested less implicit racial bias in experimental
testing. Their explanatory hypothesis for this effect was that certain
goals automatically block other competing goals (goals such as speed
and efﬁciency, which have been found to encourage the reliance on
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implicit associations). The agent’s values and goals themselves, then, can
play a role qua mechanisms that inﬂuence and calibrate the subsystems
that run without reﬂective or direct control. This is a case of one element
of a person’s psychological economy inﬂuencing another. The agent’s
values ‘keep in check’ the operation of implicit bias, such that pursuing
certain values is one way of exercising ecological control even when one is
not actively monitoring one’s actions with respect to whether they pro-
mote (or depart from) those values. Crucially, this can be so without the
agent expressly intending, at any point, to put in placemechanisms for this
purpose. One can exercise ecological control, then, without having reﬂect-
ively taken (in senses 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 above) ecological control.
There is much more that can be said here (indeed, the literature on
implicit biases and how to inﬂuence them is growing at a tremendous
rate), but for present purposes we can simply point out that the idea that
an agent’s implicit biases are beyond her control in any relevant sense is
simply false. Whilst implicit biases themselves are rarely under our
direct, evaluative, or intervention control, empirical studies indicate
that the kind of ecological control that we exercise in many actions and
cognitions can, in many ways, be extended to implicit biases as well.
While some of these strategies for controlling implicit biases may look
exotic, we hold that another virtue of Clark’s discussion is that he
articulates a notion of control that seems to capture something at the
core of many of these strategies, whilst making clear that use of this kind
of control is actually quite mundane. It is a type of control that underlies
a vast swathe of human behaviour and problem-solving.
This observation supports our second claim, that susceptibility to
ecological control is sufﬁcient for evaluation, and that in virtue of their
susceptibility to this kind of control, implicit biases and actions inﬂu-
enced by them are proper targets of character-based evaluation. We
believe our discussion renders this claim plausible by showing that
there is nothing unusual about the processes implicated in implicit
biases, and that denying they are the proper objects of moral evaluation
would commit the proponents of this claim to far wider scepticism about
the moral evaluation of our cognitive states and actions than they seem
to acknowledge.13 Unless some further way in which such processes
13 Nomy Arpaly 2003, for instance, has argued that automatic actions of tennis players
are apt targets for evaluation; see also Doris 2002, 2009.
IMPLICIT BIAS, CHARACTER, AND CONTROL 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 21/9/2015, SPi
Comp. by: hramkumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002605673 Date:21/9/15
Time:09:50:37 Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002605673.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 124
differ from our other cognitive processes can be identiﬁed, denying that
such states are evaluable as part of ‘who the agent is’ will entail denying
that many of our commonplace actions and judgements are apt candi-
dates for character-based evaluation also. Whilst embracing scepticism is
always an option, we do not believe that it would be charitable to
attribute this to our interlocutors. There are two further challenges to
address.
5.4.4 Two challenges
The ﬁrst challenge to this conclusion asks whether all kinds of control
that might fall under the rubric of ‘ecological control’ are sufﬁcient for
biases (that are potentially controllable in these ways) to be evaluable. To
see the worry here, note that some of the methods of ecological control
we identiﬁed (conscious use of environmental props) fall into the cat-
egory of the ‘negative programme’ of character development, described
by Webber in his chapter on this volume. The negative programme
involves acknowledging our susceptibility to the inﬂuence of implicit
biases (and other forms of situational manipulation), and aiming to
mitigate or eliminate those inﬂuences (changing the environment to
prime for counter-stereotypical exemplars, say). Is it really possible,
Webber’s challenge goes, to try to counteract every possible bias one
might be susceptible to (race, age, gender, height, class, educational
background, and so on and so on)? If not, then is it really fair to take
such biases into account when we evaluate individuals, ﬁnding it to their
discredit should some such inﬂuences persist—especially in the absence
of comprehensive and easily accessible information about how to combat
all forms (and potential interactions) of such bias?
We argue that it is reasonable to maintain that implicit biases can be
part of the target of character-based evaluation, even if such informa-
tion is not (yet!) readily accessible, and even if it would be extremely
demanding to undertake the negative programme in relation to each
bias. Firstly, the fact that it would be very demanding does not mean
that it would not be to the agent’s credit to undertake such a project,
and to their discredit to the extent that they have failed to do so. But
secondly, and most crucially, it is worth noting that the second two
strategies for ecological control that we identify—consciously employ-
ing cognitive props, and the role of automatic processes unconsciously
employed in regulating implicit biases—fall under what Webber
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describes as the ‘positive programme’ of character development.
This programme consists of the entrenchment of attitudes and dis-
positions to act well. Ecological control strategies of this variety are
properly thought of as part of a positive programme of developing
cognitive and motivational habits that enable agents to be robustly
resistant to implicit biases. It is precisely because the susceptibility to
implicit bias is bound up with the strength of agents’ habits and
commitments that such dispositions are apt candidates for character-
based evaluation.
The second challenge asks whether, given the extent that an individ-
ual’s dispositions are dependent upon these kinds of ‘props’, those
dispositions should be considered part of that individual’s character at
all. Don’t we give up on the notion of character altogether once we
recognize how fragile those character trait-like dispositions are, and
how dependent they are on the support of such environmental
resources? We think not. Rather, we respond by pointing out that
while this challenge may seem decisive to those in the grip of a common
picture of what character amounts to, it is not the only picture, and
perhaps not the best one. Rather, our view ﬁts quite nicely what Maria
Merritt (2000) calls the Humean model of character. She distinguishes
the Aristotelian model of character, on which an individual’s disposi-
tions are ‘ﬁrm and unchanging’ and are motivationally sufﬁcient to
produce virtuous action, from the Humean model that she prefers (in
no small part because she holds it is better equipped to withstand the
situationist critiques of virtue ethical theories). Merritt shows how the
Humean model permits stability of character to be supported by a range
of mechanisms that prominently include social relations and environ-
mental settings (2000, 377–80). By her lights, the normative task is then
to seek the social and environmental factors that best support stable
dispositions to act well. In this, we see ourselves as fellow travellers with
Merritt, and assert that our discussion of character in this paper is best
understood on the Humean model she champions. And so in our view,
what falls within the scope of character evaluations is not only the
behavioural dispositions implicated in implicit bias themselves, but
also the agent’s sensitivity (both conscious and otherwise) to the kinds
of environmental settings that permit those dispositions to take hold—or
those which function as effective regulatory mechanisms in serving the
agent’s endorsed goals and values.
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In sum, then, we hold that since a person can exert intervention and
ecological control over implicit biases, there is a real sense in which
whether or not they inﬂuence an individual’s behaviour is very much a
reﬂection of that person’s character. Thus, the behavioural dispositions
implicated in implicit biases, and the behaviours they inﬂuence, are an
appropriate subject matter for character-based evaluation.
5.5 Character and Self-Regulation
with Ecological Control
We have argued that it is possible for individuals to exercise control over
their implicit biases on the model of ecological control—devolving the
task of mitigating the inﬂuence of implicit bias to parts of their environ-
ment, or to mechanistic conscious or automatic cognitive responses. In
this section, we make an important qualiﬁcation of this claim, and tease
out two important implications of our conclusion.
5.5.1 Ecological control and epistemic conditions
We have argued that an individual can take and exercise ecological
control over her implicit biases—it is possible for her to do so—and so
she cannot, on grounds of lack of control, maintain that her implicit
biases are not evaluable.
However, our conclusion is vulnerable to the following objection: we
claim that it is possible for individuals to exercise such control (see
sections 5.4.1–3) over implicit biases. But whether, for any individual,
she can in fact exercise ecological control depends on whether she is
aware of these possibilities (and indeed, aware of the phenomena of
implicit bias, and that she may be affected by it). So the mere possibility
of having ecological control is not sufﬁcient for implicit biases to be
considered as ‘part of the agent’ and hence morally evaluable. In addition
to the control conditions, epistemic conditions must also be met as well.
For present purposes, we are willing to accept that ecological control
can permit moral evaluation only if other conditions also obtain.
(Indeed, the authors’ opinions differ on whether epistemic conditions
are necessary. One of us believes that awareness of implicit bias is not
required, because awareness of all processes involved in the production
of action cannot be a condition on that action being evaluable (Holroyd
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2012), and because normative conditions about what individuals should
know rather apply (Holroyd forthcoming). The other believes that they
are, but that these epistemic conditions are sensitive to context in various
ways, including the social role occupied by the individual in question, as
well as the contents of her external epistemic environment (see Kelly and
Washington forthcoming).)
However, this dispute can be set aside: our key claim is that a certain
argumentative move cannot be made. That move is to deny that implicit
biases are part of who the agent is—or that they can be evaluated for
being inﬂuenced by them—because the agent lacks control over such
mental entities. We have identiﬁed an important sense in which agents
can have control over such mental entities. If implicit biases are rogue
states beyond moral evaluation, then, it is not because they are beyond
the scope of the agent’s control.
If this is endorsed, then we believe there are two further implications
for our understanding of control, character, and self-regulation.
5.5.2 Intervention control on an ecological model
Recall Snow’s idea that even if one lacks reﬂective, direct control over
one’s cognitions and behaviours, they remain morally evaluable if one
retains intervention control—the ability to exert inﬂuence on autono-
mously running processes by stopping them or redirecting how they
shape action. According to this understanding of intervention control,
individuals lack it in relation to implicit biases—it is very difﬁcult to
prevent behavioural manifestation of implicit bias via direct reﬂective
control. The job interview panellist cannot effectively intervene on the
operation of implicit biases as they inﬂuence cognition, simply by think-
ing: ‘Oops, there it goes; better get my cognitive processes back on track
and stop that biased evaluation.’
If the ecological control model is endorsed, then we claim that a
broader understanding of ‘intervention control’ is warranted. An agent
can intervene in some automatic process not by bringing it under direct
reﬂective control at the moment of its activation, but by diverting its
activation by means of some environmental or cognitive prop put in
place to derail unwanted cognitive or behavioural patterns. If this more
expansive understanding of intervention control is endorsed, then agents
can retain control and be morally evaluable for actions even when those
actions cannot be brought under direct reﬂective control as typically
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understood. Thus the range of behaviours that are candidates for evalu-
ation as moral or virtuous action could be greater than on Snow’s narrow
construal of intervention control—although its full extent, and how that
class might be delineated in a full account of ecological control, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
5.5.3 Character development on an ecological model
We initially framed our discussion by considering whether implicit
biases are properly thought of as part of ‘who the agent is’, and showing
how this question turned on the kind of control the agent might have
over the mental entities involved in implicit bias. Our main claim has
been that taking ecological control is one way in which people can shape
the processes and behaviours that constitute character. This claim also
has implications for how to understand character development.
Our inquiry was motivated by Besser-Jones’s remarks that indicated
that implicit biases were a proper candidate in the moral evaluation of
character. We have attempted to vindicate this claim by showing that
implicit biases are appropriately understood as under the agent’s control
in a way that renders them objects of character-based moral evaluation.
But even given her willingness to include such implicit attitudes in the set
of character-constituting attitudes, we ﬁnd her remarks on character
development in need of some ﬂeshing out. In her early work (2008)
Besser-Jones focuses on self-regulation by means of prescriptions that
remind the agent of the priority of acting well, and strategic rules for
action or a decision procedure to be relied on in difﬁcult cases.
Given the signiﬁcant role that implicit processes have in inﬂuencing
action, it is clear that both of these strategies will be at best partial, as they
speak to the agent’s regulation of wayward inﬂuences that are within the
ﬁeld of her cognitive attention. In her later (2014) work, Besser-Jones
articulates two more strategies that might enable the development of
virtuous character even in the face of challenges presented by automatic
processes that can hinder the pursuit of virtuous goals. The ﬁrst strategy
involves the articulation of a hierarchical structure of goal-directed
activity that will help translate abstract ideals into sequences for concrete
actions in fulﬁlment of those goals. This, in turn, will set up feedback
loops that will facilitate evaluating whether those actions are in fact
serving those goals (2014, 150–2). The second type of strategy for
developing virtue also appeals to self-regulation, this time via the
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articulation of plans for action which are then used to anticipate oppor-
tunities for acting well, and helping ensure those opportunities are seized
(152–4). For example, Besser-Jones recommends the use of implemen-
tation intentions, which enable agents to be cued to situational features
that should trigger goal pursuits, rather than irrelevant situational fea-
tures of the sort shown to hinder acting well.
These two strategies seem much better placed to address the kinds of
implicit cognitions that may both serve, or hinder, the development of
good character and action upon it. However, given the concerns about
implicit bias, we propose two further ways in which these strategies for
the development of virtue could be supplemented.
First, in relation to the evaluation of whether action sequences are
serving goals, we note that it may not always be obvious whether an
agent’s actions are hindering one’s goals. Consider the goal of acting
justly; if agents are (for various reasons) unaware that their actions are
inﬂected with implicit bias, then it may not be apparent to them that
certain actions they perform are not serving this goal. Accordingly,
agents should supplement their hierarchical goal structures with active
investigation into possible ways their actions might be hindering their
goals which are not available to introspection.
Secondly, with respect to the plans for action, we note that Besser-
Jones gives most attention to the manipulation of cognitive resources
(such as implementation intentions) that help agents act in accordance
with their commitments. Our discussion of ecological control, and the
way that external environments can be harnessed to enable agents to
better act in the service of their goals, shows the importance of supple-
menting these strategies with ones that utilize environmental as well as
cognitive props to enable individuals to effectively take and exercise
ecological control.
These friendly extensions to Besser-Jones’s prescriptions are attuned
speciﬁcally to how one might ensure the development of virtuous char-
acter and action in the face of challenges from research on implicitly
biased cognitions.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
We have argued that there is an important sense in which individuals
have control over implicit biases, and this kind of control is a sort that is
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commonplace in our exercise of agency. Ecological control is the struc-
turing of one’s environment and cognitive habits such that autonomous
processes and subsystems can effectively fulﬁl one’s person-level goals.
We set out at least three ways in which individuals can take or exercise
ecological control with respect to their implicit biases.
There are two central implications of this claim: ﬁrstly, that agents can
have this kind of control means that (subject to other necessary condi-
tions being met) such implicit attitudes can be the appropriate target of
character-based evaluation. Secondly, that agents can exercise this con-
trol means that (subject to other necessary conditions obtaining) such
implicit attitudes can be properly regarded as part of ‘who the agent is’—
part of her character, which is as a whole subject to moral evaluation.
This does not, of course, preclude the agent taking up a stance of disgust
or alienation towards that part of her character; that stance is part of
‘who she is’ too.
If one’s character involves not only one’s beliefs, behavioural disposi-
tions, and attitudes towards these mental entities, but also the cognitive
habits that one uses environmental and mechanistic strategies to shape,
then a model of character development and regulation must also make
adequate prescriptions for the exercise of ecological control.
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